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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
CARRIERS.
In Texas Mexican Ry. Co. v. Gallagher, 70 S. W. 97,
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds that where in an
contract of action for damages to cattle shipped on de-
Carriage fendant's railway, the plaintiff alleged that the
shipment was under an oral contract with the defendant's
agent, and that the written contract afterwards signed by
him, limiting defendant's liability to its own line was exe-
cuted under circumstances constituting duress, but it ap-
peared that at the time of the alleged oral contract, he had
knowledge of a rule of the defendant requiring all its ship-
ments to be made under a written contract, he was not enti-
tled to recover on the oral contract. See Railroad Co. v.
Wright, 58 S. W. 846.
CODE PLEADING.
In general the states which have adopted the Reformed
Procedure provide that a counterclaim may be interposed
Counterclaim by the defendant to the plaintiff's demand when
it is a cause of action in favor of the defendant
against the plaintiff arising out of the contract or transaz-
tion set forth in the complaint. The question of when a
cause of action is regarded as arising out of the same trans-
action as that relied on by the plaintiff is one that has not
been satisfactorily cleared up by the decisions. In Patterson
v. Bradley, 69 S. W. 821, the Court of Appeals of Indian
Territory holds that under this provision, in an action to
recover for threshing defendant's grain, his claim against
the plaintiff for damages for negligently setting fire to and
burning other grain while doing such threshing may be set
out in the answer as a counterclaim.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The constitution of Nebraska contains a provision to be
found in some form or other in all, or nearly all, the state
Religious constitutions or laws, namely, that "no sectarian
Exercses in instruction shall be allowed in any school or
Schools institution supported, in whole or in part, by the
public funds set apart for educational expenses." It is held
in State v. Scheve, 91 N. W. 846, that exercises by a teacher
. in a public school in a school building, in school hours, and
in the presence of the pupils, consisting of the reading of
passages from the Bible, and in the singing of songs and
hymns, and offering prayer to the Deity are forbidden. The
principal ground upon which the decision is based is that
different translations of the Bible being accepted or rejected
by different sects, it is impossible to have reading from it
without such reading taking on a sectarian character. One
judge dissents from this view, refusing to regard the trans-
lation as sectarian in character, and holding that the pro-
vision did not intend to exclude the Bible from the schools.
He concurs in the result on the ground that the manner of
conducting the exercises in the particular case was of a sec-
tarian nature.
CONTRACTS.
A woman compromised and released a claim for a broken
hip. She knew when she settled that her hip had been
Mistake as a broken and that it was a bad break. She was
oround of induced by the statement of her own physician,
Avoidance who was also the company's physician, to be-
lieve and did believe that she would be well within a year,
and she settled upon that basis. She was mistaken, and her
injury and disability turned out to be permanent. Under
these facts the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
(Eighth Circuit) holds in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wil-
cox, II6 Fed. 913, that her mistake furnished no ground
for an avoidance of her release. A mistake of a past or
present fact, it is said, may warrant a rescission of a contract
of settlement or release. But a mistake in opinion or belief
relative to the future duration or effect of a personal injury
is not a mistake of fact, and is no ground for the avoidance
of a release or of a contract of settlement.
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CONTRACTS.
In Daily v. Minnick, 91 N. W. 913. the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that the privilege of naming a child is a valid
Consideration, and legal consideration for a promise to convey
Enforcement land to the child. Where parents contracted to
allow a relative to name their child in consideration of his
agreement to convey land to the child, and the child was
named, and continued to bear the name down to the bring-
ing of the suit to obtain the land, he thereby ratified the
contract made for him by his parents, and there was suf-
ficient privity between him and the promisee to entitle
him to sue. Nor, it is said, was the contract void
for want of mutuality. A further objection was raised
that the contract was indefinite and the consideration
past in view of the following facts. The relative agreed to
convey forty acres of land, and at the time of the agree-
ment he did not own any land which could be appropriated
to the contract, but after the child was named he purchased
a particular forty acres of land, and thereafter by his decla-
rations and otherwise, showed that he intended to appro-
priate such land to the fulfillment of the contract. The court
holds that the original consideration, though past, was suf-
ficient to support such new agreement made by the deceased
after purchasing the land, so as to render the contract en-
forceable. One judge delivers a strong dissenting opinion.
In Reindl v. Heath, 91 N. V. 734, it appeared that the
defendants contracted to deliver a certain number of logs
Independent to be sawed by the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs
Stipulations agreed to saw for no other parties during the
season. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that the
fact that the plaintiffs sawed for other parties during the
season, such sawing not interfering, however, with their
work for the defendants, did not justify the defendants in
refusing further delivery of fogs, it being merely the breach
of an independent stipulation. Compare Proprietors v.
Hovey, 21 Pick. 437. and Tipton v. Feitner, 2o N. Y. 425.
CONVERSION.
The test which determines whether one was a willful or
an innocent trespasser is not his violation of or compliance
Timber, with the law, but his honest belief and actual in-
Willful Act tention at the time he committed the trespass,
and neither a justification of his acts nor any other complete
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defence to them is essential to establish the fact that lie was
not a willful trespasser: U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals
(Eighth Circuit) in United States v. Homestake Min. Co.,
117 Fed. 481. This is said with reference to its applica-
tion in regard to the measure of damages, whether the value
of the trees when standing, or their value after cut down,
which depends upon whether the trespass is willful or inno-
cent.
CORPORATIONS.
The plan of the United States Steel Corporation to sub-
stitute bonds for preferred stock gave rise to litigation
Relrement already reported to a great extent in the daily
of Preferred press. One of the cases of interest is Berger v.
Stock for United States Steel Corporation, 53 Atl. 14, in
Bonds which the Court of Chancery of- New Jersey
holds that the reasonableness or judiciousness of a plan for
the reduction of corporate capital stock by c:changing bonds
therefor with the consent of the stockholders, and through
the medium of a banking concern, when viewed in its busi-
ness aspect is a matter wholly subject to the decision of
the members and stockholders; and such decision will not be
interfered with by the court upon the opposition of a dis-
senting stcckholder except on the ground that the plan is
clearly illegal. Preferred stock of a corporation was by its
certificate made a first lien on all its assets. It was pro-
posed to issue corporate bonds to an amount equal to two-
fifths of the preferred stock, to be exchanged for preferred
stock with such holders of preferred stock as consented to
the exchange. These bonds were to be secured by a lien
prior to that of the preferred stock. The court applying the
principle stated above holds that as stockholders not con-
senting to the proposed exchange would be deprived of their
vested right of precedence in distribution, to the extent of
the capital represented by the bond issue, the plan was illegal.
This decision was reversed on appeal to the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey: Berger v. United States Steel
Corp., 53 At]. 68, the court holding that the minority stock-
holder must abide by the decision of the majority in refer-
ence to a policy of management determined by them, and
that under the law the majority have a right to create a
lien prior to that of the preferred stockholders.
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The Supreme Court of Indiana in Nappanee Canning Co.
v. Reid, Murdock & Co., 64 N. E. 870, lays down the rule
Insolvency, generally that an insolvent private manufactur-
Preference ing corporation may prefer its directors, or
creditors on whose claims the directors are sureties, though-
their votes are necessary therefor, and though loss is thereby
caused to persons having claims against the corporation, the
directors owing no duty to the creditors. It is not surprising
to find a dissent, but rather surprising that it is on the part
of but one judge. Compare Sargent v. Webster, 13 Metc.
497-
CRIMINAL LAW.
After a jury had retired to deliberate on a verdict, the
foreman sent a communication to the judge, asking if the
Communlca- jury could recommend the defendant to the
io. between mercy of the court, which the judge answered
Judge and in the affirmative, and stated that he had made it
Jury an invariable rule to follow such recommenda-
tions. The Supreme Court of South Dakota holds in State
v. Kiefer, 91 N. W. 117, that such communication was
prejudicial error. But affidavits of jurors that the communi-
cation by the judge in answer to a question submitted after
the submission of the cause influenced their verdict of con-
viction, are not admissible for the purpose of impeaching
the verdict.
DEEDS.
In Evans v. New Auditorium Pier Co., 53 Atl. III, the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that where the sev-
charging eral owners of lots fronting on a beach and
Und with extending to high-water mark join in a deed
Restrictions granting to a city, for their own benefit and that
of the public, a continuous strip across them at the ocean
edge for a walk, with a covenant that no bilding shall be
erected to the oceanward of the strip, this restriction attaches
in favor of another grantor, to lands below high-water mark
owned by one of the grantors, who had acquired the state's
title thereto. See also Atlantic City v. New Auditorium
Pier Co., 53 At]. 99, and Atlantic City v. Atlantic City
Steel Pier Co. (N. J. Ch.), 49 Atl. 825.
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EQUITY.
In Maine a statute authorizes the Court of Equity to in-
terfere by injunction to abate a nuisance arising from the
Injunction, unlawful sale of liquor. In Davis v. Auld, 53
Intoxicating Atl. 118, the Supreme Judicial Court of tMaine
Iquors holds, against the dissent of two judges, that
this act is not unconstitutional; that -the fact that the dis-
obedience by the defendant of the injunction in such suit is
ipso facto a criminal offence, subjecting him to punishment
for the crime, does not exempt him from other punishment
by the court for disobedience of its injunction as for con-
tempt. The operation of the statute, it is said, is not to
punish for past criminal acts. nor to enjoin from the com-
mission of criminal acts in the future, but is to prevent the
further continuance of a present, existing, continuous nuis-
ance or hurt, a statute of the state having declared a place
where intoxicating liquors were sold contrary to law to be
a common nuisance. See Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550,
for an exhaustive discussion of the question as to how far
the right to a jury trial is involved in such a situation.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds in Oppenheimer
v. Collins, 91 N. W. 69o , that where creditors sue to subject
Suit by to their claims the debtor's interest in the estate
Creditors of an intestate, the burden is on them to show
no property of the value of the claim which can be reached
by execution, and a return on execution of nudla bona is a
prima facie showing of the exhaustion of legal remedies,
entitling the creditor to proceed in equity. See Davelaar v.
Investment Co., 1I0 Wis. 470.
EVIDENCE.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Cox v. Coin-
monwealth, 69 S. W. 799, that while the declaration of the
Contradiction father of the accused to the mother of the de-
of Witness ceased (the trial being for homicide) that no
one regretted the killing more than he did, and that he
would prefer, if such a thing were possible, that it were his
boy that was shot, as he had always been a bad unruly boy.
was not admissible as substantive testimony, it was admis-
sible to contradict the statement of the father as a witness
that the accused was at the date of the homicide and previ-
ous thereto insane. And it is further held that while the
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court should have instructed the jury as to the purpose of
the testimony, its failure to do so was not materially preju-
dicial.
The express agreement to pay contained in a promissory
note of the usual form constitutes such instrument a com-
Parol plete contract, importing on its face an absolute
Evidence Rule obligation, as to which a reservation of right
not to pay is contradictory: Supreme Court of Kansas in
Thisler v. Mackey, 70 Pac. 334. It is. therefore, held that
the parol evidence rule applies, and that oral evidence of a
contemporaneous agreement to surrender the note without
payment, in rescission of the contract pursuant to which it
was given, is inadmissible. See. however, Babcock v. De-
ford, 14 Kans. 408.
In State v. Height, 91 N. W. 935, the Supreme Court of
Iowa holds that a compulsory physical examination of a
Physical person accused of a crime for the purpose of
examination ascertaining if he is affected with a disease al-
of Accused leged to have been communicated to the prose-
cutrix at the time of the commission of the crime, is in vio-
lation of the constitutional provision that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law," and all evidence with reference to information se-
cured by such examination is inadmissible. The court goes
into a careful consideration of the subject, and reviews the
authorities bearing upon it. "The only case," it is said,
"sustaining the right to require disclosure of those parts of
the person not usually exposed is that of State v. Ah Chuey,
14 Nev. 79. 33 Am. Rep. 530, where it was held not im-
proper to require the exposure of the forearm to discover
tattoo marks for identification, and even in this case it is
said that accused should never be compelled to make any
indecent or offensive exhibition of his person for any pur-
pose whatever."
EXCHANGES.
In Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., ii6 Fed. 944, the U. S. Circuit Court (W. D., Mis-
Property souri) holds that the Board of Trade of the city
Right in of Chicago has at least a qualified property riglt
Quotations in the quotations made on its exchange based
on transactions between its members and gathered by its
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own employes, and in their distribution, and in such right
it is entitled to protection by a court of equity, as against
one who obtains and uses such quotations without comply-
ing with reasonable regulations established by it as a con-
dition to the right of others to receive and use its quota-
tions. The regulations which are held reasonable are that
the quotations shall not be used in the conduct of a "bucket
shop," and that they shall be for the private and individual
use of the applicant and the business in which he is engaged.
The defendants had refused to comply with these require-
ments.
FEDERAL COURTS.
A state cannot by legislation confer a substantive right
or remedy in the way of a suit inter partes upon its own
Jurisdiction citizens that will not be available to the citizens
of the other states, nor can it by any device re-
strict such right or remedy thus made available to enforce-
ment in its own courts, the conditions of citizenship being
such that it would otherwise be enforceable in the federal
courts: U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit)
in Williams v. Crabb, 117 Fed. 193. So it is held that where
the statutes of a state confer upon a state court of equity
original jurisdiction of suits to contest the validity of a pro-
bated will, a circuit court of the United States has concurrent
jurisdiction of such a suit in which the amount in controversy
i; sufficient and the parties are citizens of different states.
Compare Darragh v. Manufacturing Co., 23 C. C. A. 609.
"By any other view," it is said, "it would be in the power
of a state by legislation to deprive citizens of other states
either of the new right or remedy given by the state statute
or of the forum granted by the federal constitution and
laws. The citizen of another state cannot be compelled to
make such election, or to accept a remedy upon condition
that he forego the constitutional forum to which he would
otherwise be entitled."
FELLOW SERVANT.
The U. S. Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) holds in
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Anthes, 117 Fed. 118, that where
Concurring a servant is injured owing to the negligence of
Negligence the master in furnishing proper appliances for
an elevator, the negligence of a fellow servant in the opera-
100
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tion of the elevator does not relieve the master from lia-
bility. See also Clark v. Soule, 137 Mass. 38o, and the late
case of Loveless v. Standard Gold Min. Co., 42 S. E. 741.
FRAUD.
The general question of how far a party is bound to dis-
close facts within his own knowledge relating to a contract
Concealment is stated as a general principle in Thomas v.
m furphy, 91 N. V. 1097, where the Supreme
Court of Minnesota holds that if a party conceals a fact
material to the transaction, and peculiarly within his own
knowledge, knowing that the other party acts on the pre-
sumption that no such fact exists, it is as much of a fraud as
if the existence of such fact were expressly denied, or the
reverse of it expressly stated.
GIFTS.
In Ross v. Walker, 32 Southern, 934, the Supreme Court
of Florida holds that where the subject-matter of an alleged
Validity, gift consists of a debt due the donor by the
Dueblls donee, evidenced by duebills, and no receipt for
the debt is actually given, and no credit entered, and where
the evidence of the debt is not cancelled, destroyed, deliv-
ered to the donee, or otherwise placed beyond the control
of the donor, no valid gift is effected. Until consummated
in the manner stated, the transaction amounts to no more
than a promise to give, which being without a valuable con-
sideration, will not be enforced by the courts.
HOMICIDE.
The Supreme Court of Florida, adopting the well-settled
rule that the belief of the accused as to the apparent neces-
Justification, sity to kill in order to save his own life or pro-
Belief of tect him from great personal injury, must be
Necessity based upon facts and circumstances justifying
such belief, holds in Lane v. State, 32 Southern, 896, that
where the evidence authorizes the submission to the jury
of this question, the actual belief of the accused is material,
and it is error to refuse to permit him who is permitted by
statute to become a witness in his own behalf, to testify to
his belief based on such facts and circumstances. One judge
dissents, holding that the evidence is irrelevant. The case
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presents a careful discussion of this point as well as of other
questions in reference to justifiable homicide.
HUSBAND AND WIFE
In Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Kentucky, 69 S.
W. 751, it is held by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky that
Recitals in where a husband and his wife conveyed property
Deed which was the wife's separate estate to one who
at once reconveyed the property to the husband, each con-
veyance reciting a cash consideration, a subsequent pur-
chaser from the husband was not charged with notice of the
fact that the transaction was only colorable, and intended to
evade a provision of the instrument creating the estate, by
which the wife was prohibited from selling or incumbering
the property for any debt of the husband. As against a
subsequent innocent purchaser, a married woman is estopped
to deny the recital of her deed conveying her separate prop-
erty, to the effect that she had received the cash considera-
tion recited. See Scarborough v. WVatkins, 9 B. Mon. 540,
and Connolly v. Braustler, 3 Bush, 702. The advance taken
in the case in hand is that whereas the former cases con-
cerned the general estate of married women, this case ap-
plies the same principles to their separate estate. "Estop-
pel." says the court. "operates not so much upon the estate
as upon the conscience."
ILLEGITIMATES.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds in Fowler v.
Fowler, 42 S. E. 563, that where, by the laws of the domicile
Status of the parents at the time of the birth of their
illegitimate child, and of their marriage, their
marriage legitimates him, the legitimacy attaches at the
time of the marriage, he being a minor, and goes with him
wherever he goes. See Story, Confl. Laws (8th Ed.), §§ 93,
93 v, and Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 252.
INFANTS.
The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Illinois Cent. R.
Co. v. Jernigan, 65 N. E. 88, that a child under the age of
Contributory seven years is, as a matter of law, incapable of
Negligence contributory negligence. This, it is said, is in
analogy to the rule of the common law which exempted chil-
dren under the age of seven years from criminal responsi-
bility. See also Rail-way Co. v. Tuohy, 196 Ills. 410.
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In Rowlands v. Voechting, 91 N. W. 99o, it appeared that
the defendant leased a farm to the plaintiff, the lease pro-
Title to viding that the plaintiff should pay in lieu of
Crops rent half of the income of the farm. The premi-
ses were placed in the exclusive possession of the plaintiff,
and the lease used the technical words, "lease, demise, and
let." Under these facts the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
holds that the relation of landlord and tenant existed and
that the title to the crops was in the tenant, with the right
of disposition, and he could recover of the landlord for a
taking by him of part of the crops from the premises. Com-
pare Strain v. Gardner, 61 Wis. 174.
LIMITATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Wilcox v. Eadie,
70 Pac. 338, that when a promissory note, and trust deed
Aclon on given as security, contain an option authorizing
Note the owner to declare the entire debt due upon
default in the payment of interest, and the exercise of this
option by an agent, before the maturity of the paper is relied
upon to support a plea of the bar of the statute of limitations,
it must be shown, to establish the defence, that the agent was
authorized to declare the paper due before maturity; and
proof that such agent received payments of interest, and
wrote a letter attempting to declare the option, is not suf-
ficient evidence of authority. See Lester v. Snyder, 55 Pac.
613. The case in hand shows an advance upon the general
rule that though a mortgagee has authorized an agent to col-
lect interest, and to receive payment of the principal when
due, the agency does not extend to receiving payment of the
principal before maturity.
MAILS.
The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit)
holds in Bankers' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, St.
Railroads s P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., Ii 7 Fed. 434, that a
Carrying railroad company carrying the United States
Agents mails, whether tinder contract or by virtue of
the requirements of the constitution and laws, is not in re-
spect to such service a common carrier, but is a public agent
of the United States, employed in performing a govern-
mental function and as such it is liable for its own negli-
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gence, butnot for the negligence or tortious acts of its sub-
ordinates or employes in the selection of whom it has exer-
cised ordinary care. For another recent case upon the same
matter see Boston Ins. Co, v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.,
92 N. W. 88.
MALICIOUS PROSECUT!ON.
In an action for malicious prosecution, a requested in-
struction that by malice is meant special or particular malice;
Particular not general malice, but particular malice against
Malice the plaintiff; and that, before the plaintiff could
recover, he must prove that the defendant was prompted by
particular malice toward him in procuring his arrest, etc.-
was proper, and its refusal was error :--Supreme Court of
North Carolina in Savage v. Davis, 42 S. E. 571.
MECHANICS' LIENS.
In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, it appeared that the
principal debtors had been discharged of the debt by proceed-
Bankruptcy ings in bankruptcy under the federal act of 1898,
after steps to affix the lien had been taken by the
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Missouri, holds
that the discharge of the bankrupt debtor did not defeat the
lien: Holland v. Cunliff, 69 S. W. 737: "The principle,"
says the court, "on which this result must rest is that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy does not extinguish the debt, but
merely confers a personal immunity from the enforcement
thereof. Hence, any valid lien already imposed on prop-
erty to secure the debt, at the time when the bankruptcy
proceeding became effective, continues in undiminished vigor,
unless the bankrupt law itself or our own positive law abates
it. The lien in question is not of that class." See 14 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), 774; Insurance Co. v. Jackson,
12 Gray, 114.
MORAL CERTAINTY.
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Hunting-
ton, 70 Pac. 284, approves the following instruction:
Instructions "Moral certainty is described as a state of im-
pression produced by facts in which a reasonable
mind feels a sort of coercion or necessity to act in accordance
with it." Three judges dissent from this view on the gen-
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eral ground that "Instructions on the general subject of
reasonable doubt should be confined to the language that has
been frequently approved ;" that the instruction in question
was an unnecessary innovation, lacking in precision and
clearness and leading to confusion.
NAVIGABLE WATER.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee adhering to the well-
settled rule in this country that the test of the navigability
Test of of a stream in the legal, technical sense of the
Navigability term is whether or not it has capacity for the
usual purposes of navigation, holds in Webster v. Harris,
69 S. W. 782, that in determining the navigability of a body
of water under this test, it must be considered in the con-
dition it was at the time of the determination with all the
natural obstructions existing in it at the time; and conditions
as they might be altered by engineering skill and the expendi-
ture of money in the removal of obstructions cannot be con-
sidered.
NEGLIGENCE.
In Illinois the statute law provides that whoever willfully
disturbs the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family
Unlawful by loud or unusual noises shall be fined, etc.
Enterprise The Supreme Court of Illinois construing this
statute holds in Gilmore v. Fuller, 65 N. E. 84, that mem-
bers of a charivari party, engaged in serenading a bridal
couple with tin horns, sleigh bells, and firearms, are engaged
in an unlawful enterprise, and that where a member of such
party was negligently shot by another member of the party,
there could be no recovery for the injury, because it was the
result of the unlawful enterprise in which the parties were
jointly engaged. See Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407.
NUISANCE.
With two judges dissenting the Court of Appeals of New
York holds in Bly v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of
Action by New York, 64 N. E. 745, that a tenant in pos-
Lxssee, session of premises injuriously affected by the
Damages operation of an electric lighting plant, though
the lease was made during the existence of the nuisance, can
sue to abate the same. Such tenant in possession, suing to
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recover damages for a nuisance, can recover the deprecia-
tion in the rental value of the premises occasioned thereby.
The case presents a thorough review of the principles in-
volved on both sides. See the Kemochan Case, 128 N. Y.
568. and Hine v. Railroad Co., 128 N. Y. 571.
PARENT AND CHILD.
In a controversy for the custody of a child between its
mother, who voluntarily parted with its custody, and a party
Custody of who took it before it was two weeks old, and
Child cared for it with parental solicitude up to the
time of the suit,-a period of several years,-the question as
to whom the custody should be awarded must be determined
by a consideration of the child's welfare in the light of all
the circumstances: Supreme Court of Iowa in McDonald
v. Stitt, 91 N. W. 1031.
A man and his wife being advanced in years, deeded their
property to their son, taking a bond secured by a mortgage,
Bond for for a certain sum, conditioned that the son fur-
Support nish the parents support in the same house, and
as members of the son's family during their lives. Upon a
breach of the condition by the son, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin holds that the parents were not restricted to their
remedy on the bond and mortgage, but equity would regard
the performance of the condition as a condition subsequent,
a breach of which would cause a reversion of title: Wan-
ner v. Wanner, 91 N. W. 671. Compare with this case
Glocke v. Glocke (Wis.) 89 N. W. 118.
PARTNERSHIP.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Sturgeon
v. Apollo Oil & Gas Co., 53 Atl. I89, that where a limited
Limited partnership association is duly created by three
Partnership persons, who hold themselves out as limited part-
ners, two of them are estopped to assert subsequently that
the third has no interest in fact in the firm. Thus a limited
partnership association was formed by three persons, each
having a nominal division of the capital stock. The capital
was borrowed by two of the parties from a limited partner-
ship which they controlled. The money thus borrowed was
thereafter paid out of the profits. The court holds that the
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other partner was entitled to his share when the partnership
was ultimately dissolved, though he had made no actual con-
tribution to the capital. See Rowley's Appeal, I I5 Pa. 150.
Where three persons form such a limited partnership, the
third partner cannot be excluded from the profits on the
allegation that his name was used merely because a third
person was required under the statute, when the articles were
recorded in successive years in which he was held out to the
orid as an actual partner.
PHYSICIANS.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky discussing the measure
of skill required from a physician, reverses the lower court
Skill Required in Burk v. Foster, 69 S. W. 1O96, and holds
that the care and skill required of a physician in
treating a patient is not to be measured by that exercised by
"ordinarily skilful and prudent physicians in that [par-
ticular] vicinity in treating a like injury," but by such as
is exercised generally by physicians of ordinary care and
skill in similar communities. It is also said that the mere
fact that the result of a patient's treatment "is as good as is
usually obtained in like cases similarly situated" will not
preclude a recovery by the patient against the physician for
negligence and lack of skill, the patient being entitled to the
chance for the better results which might come from proper
treatment.
QUITCLAIM DEED.
The owner of a building conveyed three inches of land
to an adjoining owner, with the right to use his party wall,
Construction in consideration of a covenant by the grantee,
and Effect stipulated to run with the land that she would
not during a specified time use the building to be erected for
a saloon. A dispute arose as to the title to a portion of the
lot, and the grantor executed and delivered for a considera-
tion a quit claim deed of her entire lot, including the portion
in dispute, without any reservation as to the building re-
striction. Against the dissent of three judges the Courf of
Appeals of New York holds in Uihlein. v. Matthews, 64 N.
E. 792, that the building restriction was thereby removed.
Nor is evidence admissible of acts and conversations between
the parties to a quitclaim deed. before its delivery, in order
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to show that it was not intended thereby to release a build-
ing restriction in a prior deed to a part of the same land.
See Jenks v. Quinn, 137 N. Y. 223.
RAILROADS.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Denison &
Sherman Ry. Co. v. Randell, 69 S. W. 1013, that where, in
Ejectinn o an action for malicious assault and ejecting of a
Passenger, passenger from a street car, it was shown that
Ratifica-ion the conductor was prosecuted before a justice,
by Company and that the railroad defended him by its attor-
neys, and that its general manager was present at the trial,
and paid the conductor's fine, and that he was retained in the
company's employ after the assault, a finding that the com-
pany ratified the conductor's acts was justified.
RELEASE.
In Carroll v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 69 S.
W. OO4, it appeared that a servant, after being injured, re-
Consideration turned to his work, and a few days later exe-
cuted a release of claim for damages, in con-
sideration of the master's agreement to employ him for such
time only as might be satisfactory to the master, he knowing
of the master's rule not to keep in its employ one injured in
its service unless he executed a release. He worked for a
month longer, receiving pay therefor, and then left volun-
tarily. Under these facts the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas holds that though the agreement to give employment
for an indefinite time was no consideration for the release,
yet the employment given after the release was under the
contract of employment evidenced thereby, and was a suf-
ficient consideration for the release. Compare Railway Co.
v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70.
STOCK DIVIDENDS.
Where a dividend has been declared by a corporation on
its capital stock, payable in new stock certificates, based on
Income accumulated profits, it is received as income by
the stockholders, and not capital. Court of Ap-
peals of New York in Lowry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
64 N. E. 796.
